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The Population Discourse: A Transnational Matrix. 
The Case of Germany and Sweden 
Thomas Etzemüller  
Abstract: »Der Bevölkerungsdiskurs. Eine transnationale Matrix. Deutschland 
und Schweden im Vergleich«. Since the 19th century, the question of popula-
tion has been discussed in the form of a specific matrix. Population is de-
scribed as human capital. It can serve a modern nation as a resource if it is bio-
logically and socially optimised, but could also pose a threat if ‘degeneration’ 
escalates. Thus, the demographic question is always dealt with in a dualistic 
manner. The human capitals’ ‘valuable’ part does not breed enough children, 
the socially or biologically problematic or even ‘substandard’ part of the popu-
lation produces far too much offspring. The fact that this pattern shapes the 
speaking about population transnationally, can be shown by comparing such 
very different social systems like Sweden and Germany. 
Keywords: demography, eugenics, modernity, social politics, welfare state, 
population question, Sweden, Germany. 
I. 
This paper is not about demography but the speaking about demographical 
processes. This is an important difference. Demographers deal with alleged 
real, objectively measurable developments. In contrast to them, I argue that 
demography is a construction – this notion exists since the end of the 19th 
century – and that this construction is formatted by a specific narrative pattern, 
which I call the ‘matrix’ of the population discourse. By claiming that the col-
lecting and interpreting of demographical data is shaped by social factors, I do 
not want suggest that demography is a pseudo-science. The sociology of sci-
ence has investigated for several decades how closely objective scientific 
methods and social processes are connected (e.g. Weingart 2003; Felt, 
Nowotny and Taschwer 1995). Analysing the population discourse is thus to be 
understood as a contribution to reflect on the demographers’ scientific work. 
First of all, a few words on the method. The – probably – most important 
representative of discourse analysis, Michel Foucault, did not think too much 
of the conception that ideas and statements have an origin, exert causal effects 
on each other or have been developed and uttered intentionally by autonomous 
individuals (cf. Foucault 1992, 1989; Williams 1999; Keller 2001, 2007). He 
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investigated the rules of the formation of statements. These are characterised by 
either unity or breaches. To Foucault, statements initially were punctual inci-
dents: they appear, become transformed and disappear. Discourses are the 
amount of statements that obey to one and the same principle of formation; 
discursive formations are the principles of distribution and diversification of 
statements. This is basically about the question why statements see the light of 
the day and others do not, and by which rules they become coalesced to an 
entity and dispersed on different surfaces. 
Neither discourses nor their formation can be traced back to individuals and 
their intentions; they cannot be limited to one nation. There are, however, par-
allel or competing discourses. Statements can fade into other discourses and 
become transformed there; they also transform other discourses. Discourses or 
discursive formations, respectively, produce temporary units of statements that 
could have clear social effects on society. But, time and again, there are 
breaches. Discourses become transformed, transferred or they disappear. They 
do not have one origin, but arise from different sources; they do not develop 
into an ever increasing perfection, but change their shape, their target and the 
places of their occurrence. Things are not preexistent to discourses, but dis-
courses are practices that generate the things (e.g. the “population”); they do 
not exert causal influence on each other, but they are the condition for the 
possibility of transformations; they do not have a hidden meaning that could be 
deciphered, but exert describable effects; they are no nature-given units, but 
owe their existence to specific historical constellations (which they, in turn, 
influence). A discourse is a concrete historical incident that gains or loses exis-
tence and shape in a field of other discourses and its relations to these. 
In this sense, I will read statements made by scientists and publicists and 
which are located within the context of demographical analyses as part of a 
discursive formation in order to show what the matrix, which makes us speak 
about the “population” since the 19th century, looks like. It will become appar-
ent that the population discourse is not a mere demographic question, but that it 
was (or still is?) connected to the eugenic question. I can only touch on that last 
issue here (cf. Etzemüller 2007). I would like to make plausible the transna-
tional character of that matrix by using a German-Swedish comparison; i.e. a 
comparison of two political systems that do not seem to be in any way similar. 
The principle aim of this paper is to make a specific structure of speaking visi-
ble. The price I have to pay for this is the non-consideration of several differ-
ences (cf. Weipert 2006). But if one only investigates the question of popula-
tion alongside its heterogeneity – i.e. authors, institutions, contexts, texts, all 
standing for themselves –, one cannot get a perspective on what is of interest 
here: In what way is it that population is spoken about – and in what way is it 
not? What are the social effects of this speaking? My intention is to break up 
the illusion of an alleged lack of alternatives to speak about the population, a 
lack that still goes without saying in statements of leading demographers with 
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scientific authority (cf. Birg 2005). Only when a discursive formation is ex-
posed, the option to discuss demography in alternative models emerges, be-
cause the principles of the population question’s construction become appar-
ent.1 The matrix does not only overlap different socio-political systems, but also 
political camps. Liberals, socialists, feminists, catholics and conservatives 
reproduced the population discourse similarly (or eluded it). Hence, an analysis 
employing moral or political categories is pointless; I will touch on that issue 
by comparing the German Friedrich Burgdörfer with the Swedes Alva and 
Gunnar Myrdal.  
II. 
Since the 19th century the population question has been negotiated in an apoca-
lyptic rhetoric. This discourse of crisis is marked by the fear of extinction, 
ageing and foreign infiltration. Thomas Robert Malthus’ “An Essay on the 
Principle of Population” – published in 1798 – can be considered as this dis-
course’s “urtext”. In his essay, Malthus developed his influential “law of popu-
lation”: The alimental margin can only be extended in a linear arithmetic, the 
population, however, proliferates exponentially. Thus, terrible famines and 
epidemics that adjust the demographic development to the alimental basis 
consistently emerge. Malthus did not deem an unjust social and economical 
order to be the cause for these cyclical catastrophes, but the lower-orders’ 
“irresponsible” lifestyle. Every time there is enough alimentation, they prolif-
erate regularly in excess. Social welfare would only amplify the problem, Mal-
thus declared (Malthus 1992). 
The book became a classic. By its sheer continuous presence it could set the 
tone up until today and it does not matter whether one is pro or contra Malthus. 
In this book we find important parts of the matrix that has structured; the popu-
lation discourse since the end of the 19th century: the catastrophic Gestus (one 
is, basically, always one step behind the problem); the relation between popula-
tion, resources and space as a measure for overpopulation; employing this 
measure as a relative measure (‘empty’ spaces could also be proportionally 
overpopulated); the differentiated consideration of fertility (the lower strata 
having to many children); differentiating the population in “worthy” and “un-
worthy” members; mirroring allegedly natural developments with socio-
political conditions; the moral charging of this mirroring (profligacy as a rea-
son for calamity); the claim of invisible processes which experts have to make 
visible for the audience; regulating the population in quantity and quality by 
regulating their fertility; and finally the metaphoric, reductive, extremely neat 
technique of making visible (linear/exponential progression). 
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There is a second important line in the population discourse, i.e. eugenics 
(cf. Kühl 1997; Weingart, Kroll, and Bayertz 1992). By the end of the 19th 
century the young industrial societies seemed to have got into a severe crisis. 
Urbanisation, mechanisation, migration, the change of gender relations or the 
remodelling of political constitutions brought up utterly new habits – at the 
same time, more and more people lived in calamitous circumstances. Simulta-
neously, the academic disciplines of medicine and biology were on the rise and 
they promised a solution to the problems. First of all, Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion showed that nature required considerable adaptations from each species 
and that these either mutated within a certain time or fell victim to selection. 
Now, all of a sudden, the expanding industrial societies’ social changes and 
problems could be explained. Several authors claimed that the lower strata’s 
calamity did not result from immoral or short-sighted behaviour, as Malthus 
had thought, but was evidence for the increasing degeneration of the species 
‘man’, which was due to modern life. Urbanisation, impoverishment, poor 
hygiene, diseases; in their eyes, all these developments attacked the genetic 
quality of mankind and multiplied itself progressively by heredity transmission 
right until doom – within this process, inherited and individually acquired, 
physical and social characteristics were passed on. Actually, according to this 
theory, nature kept an ideal balance by permanently selecting species that were 
not adjusted to their environment anymore. Human society, however, had be-
come askew. Modernity destroyed positive genetic material, the degenerated 
people reproduced themselves thanks to welfare politics, selection was thus 
invalidated and the species seemed doomed. At least, or so experts thought, the 
mechanism of man’s doom could be figured out. This again was a conclusion 
from nature to social order – just as Malthus did –, but this time from a strictly 
physiological adaptability of all creatures to their environment, as Darwin’s 
theory implied, to the meaning of men’s individual qualities for the persistence 
of the human species, in other words: the middle-class social order. In this 
worldview, the central problem were the ‘feeble-minded’, since they could not 
– unlike mad people – be kept in asylums. They lived their “immoral” lives 
incognito and handed down their moral-biological defects to innumerable off-
spring thanks to their above-average reproductive instinct. The eugenicists 
promised to detect these defects and to excise them from the Volkskörper – 
cleanly and perfectly like doctors cut out cancer. It is well-known to what this 
thinking led in Germany. For us it is central that the question of hereditary 
quality was added to that of the population’s quantity. 
Since the 19th century population is discussed in a specific pattern: as a re-
source and a threat – its quantity and quality. This is the matrix that shaped the 
speaking about population in Western Europe and the USA at the early and 
mid-20s and the end of the 20th century. A population can be a nation’s re-
source if it strengthens the nation with numerous and healthy children. It can 
become a threat if the wrong social class proliferates, i.e. the biologically “infe-
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rior” – today we call it the “socially problematic” – lower strata, while the 
biologically (or socially) “superior” middle class irresponsibly commits demo-
graphic suicide (Rassenselbstmord). This would expose the nation to an “infil-
tration” by “racially inferior” – today: “culturally alien” – peoples with a higher 
fertility than the threatened civilised (i.e. Western) people. In this manner, 
“population” became a political issue: the question of the social and biological 
future of the established social order, of a nation or even of the Western World. 
Hence, the German political economist Julius Wolf could phrase apodictically 
in 1931 that “the population question of today is fundamentally a question of 
the social order” (Wolf 1931, 65). 
III. 
Thus, population became the starting-point for bio-politics to regulate society. 
The sociopolitical and eugenic grand-programmes of the 1930s and 1940s were 
closely connected to the attempt to create a “healthy Volkskörper” by strength-
ening its positively attributed elements and eliminating its negatively attributed 
parts. I would like to sketch this development following the examples of Swe-
den and Germany (cf. Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005). 
In the 19th century, the situation was yet vague. Neo-Malthusians could 
make themselves heard in the USA, Great Britain, Sweden and Germany. They 
followed Malthus’ assumption that – on the whole – there were too many peo-
ple within the respective national spaces and that birth-reduction was thus 
necessary. They considered the human capital – one of the nation’s resources – 
to be threatened by a birth rate that was much too high. In contrast to Malthus, 
however, they put the focus on the lower orders’ sex education and the legalisa-
tion of abortion and contraceptives. Advocating this, Neo-Malthusians such as 
Annie Besant in Great Britain or Knut Wicksell and Hinke Bergegren in Swe-
den, caused veritable public scandal. Nevertheless, Neo-Malthusian argumenta-
tion remained within the matrix mentioned above, since it also emanated from 
a class-specifically differentiated fertility, albeit the fact that it became criti-
cally accentuated to capitalism. While the middle- and upper-classes had the 
contraceptive techniques, so the argumentation went, capitalism created a host 
of unemployed, ergo cheap labour-slaves, tax-payers and soldiers by the means 
of a high working-class fertility. Thousands of children did not survive the bad 
living conditions of their families; the survivors then physically weakened the 
labour force due to their poorness. The fighting power of the working class was 
only to be enhanced by a drastic reduction of their number of children. Families 
from the lower social strata were to be provided with an opportunity also to 
procreate qualitatively premium and healthy children. In this way, Neo-
Malthusianism embraced qualitative arguments; and this, however, could even 
mount to unmasked racism. They, for example, pointed to a difference in fertil-
ity between different countries which correlated with a reversed racial quality. 
 106 
A flood of “inferior” immigrants with many children from poor countries 
threatened – as “parasites” – the nations of a higher culture but a lower birth 
rate. Thus, after World War I some Neo-Malthusians demanded a clause in the 
League of Nations’ contract that all member states were to limit their birth rate 
in such a way that their population could comfortably live within their own 
territory and that a territorial expansion would not be necessary. Growth of 
population should not be an acceptable cause to legitimise any demand for 
territory. 
In the early 20th century, Neo-Malthusianism lost ground. First of all, this 
was due to the yet unforeseen possibility of providing a significantly extended 
alimental base for the industrial nations thanks to agro-technological achieve-
ments. Less and less people famished and this rebutted one of the Neo-
Malthusians’ central argumentative elements. Another crucial development was 
the birth rate’s continuous decline since the late 19th century. This decline was 
an effect of the first demographic transition, i.e. the transition from high to low 
death and birth rates. This phenomenon was already well known in 1912, but 
was apparently considered a “mystical hypothesis”. If this theory were true – 
Julius Wolf mocked –, then “the human reproductive organs would somehow 
follow the official reports on population statistics and produce less children, if 
it becomes obvious that less are dying” (Wolf 1931, 61, Wolf quotes E.A. 
Roß). In the discussion on population, it was in fact the middle phase of the 
transition that for a long time remained the gauge for an alleged natural devel-
opment of population: The death rate declined, but the birth rate remained high 
so that the population growth increased massively. As the birth rate belatedly 
aligned itself to the sinking death rate, the bogeyman of the population’s “ex-
tinction” appeared. Advocates of over- and underpopulation still fought bitter 
fights at international conferences, but only after World War II Neomalthusian-
ism could gain ground again; this time in the “Third World”. At that point of 
time the middle phase of transition was still the Western World’s ideal, while 
the final phase was considered a threat. When it came to the developing coun-
tries, however, it was the middle phase of transition that was considered a 
threat, while the third phase of transition was yearned for, since “organic sub-
stances” (Biomasse) from the “South” threatened “human capital” from the 
“North”(Wichterich 1994, 31). 
Since the beginning of the century, the debate was dominated by the demo-
graphic-eugenic worst-case scenario. This was neither a merely populistic trick 
with which magazines – then as now – could increase their circulation, nor a 
means which demographers employed for decades to get through to the alleg-
edly ignorant society. Actually, one could find behind it a dark vision of the 
future social development, which I would like to underline with an exemplary 
quote:  
Since the middle class is shrinking and the upper class, which lives primarily 
in the cities, only has little offspring, it is clear indeed, that the people become 
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proletarianised and that the people take a more deteriorated racial form than 
before the industrialisation. In other words: A host of more or less weakly e-
quipped individuals is developing and they will soon make themselves heard. 
If it does not work out in a good way, they will employ revolutionary or anar-
chistic (Bolshevistic) methods and will give a short shrift to anyone who is 
against it, i.e. the upper classes will have to carry the can. There will be a 
reign of terror. Everything will get out of order. The culture will decline. The 
people will soon degenerate and is going right to its downfall. New peoples 
will invade. Then it could get better or worse (Lundborg, Herman. 1921, 26 et 
seq.). 
Hermann Lundborg published this vision in 1921 in German at the well-
established Gustav Fischer Verlag. Lundborg was a Swedish eugenicist and in 
1921 founder of the world’s very first institute for racial biology in Uppsala. In 
1913 he had already made himself known with extensive “Medizinisch-
biologische Familienforschungen innerhalb eines 2232köpfigen Bauernge-
schlechtes in Schweden (Provinz Blekinge)” (“Medico-biological Family Re-
search within a Swedish Peasant Lineage of 2232 Members [Province of 
Blekinge]”), published at Fischer, too, and translated into Swedish in 1920. In 
this book Lundborg had tried to trace an extended family’s pathology. Using 
hundreds of genealogical tables he traced hereditary lines for epilepsy, mental 
diseases, negative traits of character, criminality and prostitution: a comprehen-
sive register of human abnormalities. The result was still ambivalent. He de-
scribed the lineage he investigated as degenerated, but predicted that it would 
be able to regenerate at least partly. Within the Blekinge microcosm Lundborg 
and his German colleagues found what would lurk the Swedish (or German) 
society (Lundborg 1913). 
There were similar studies in Germany, too, e.g. Eugen Fischer’s study 
about the “Rehobother Bastards”, which was also published in 1913 (Fischer 
1913). Such studies show three things: Firstly, the attempt to understand the 
“micro-physics” of eugenic processes in order to be able to draw conclusions 
on demographic developments. Secondly, the problem that such research could 
only be undertaken with extremely limited objects due to the vast amount of 
data. Thus, an overall picture could never be developed. Thirdly, due to a lack 
of genetical expertise, only the survey of social data (e.g. alcoholism, stub-
bornness, etc.) was possible. From this data experts deduced to the alleged core 
of “antisocial” behaviour. And still in the 1950s, eugenicists did not have 
enough data to actually prove their basic assumptions – instead the data had 
become that vast that in the long run it destroyed precisely these basic assump-
tions. Thus, the first generation of eugenicists became replaced by allegedly 
more scientific reform-eugenicists since the 1920s and they became in turn 
replaced by the allegedly scientific and objective human genetics since the 
1940s. Every paradigm-shift was connected to the assumption that the eugenic 
theories now could be proved scientifically. 
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It is well-known that this way of thinking lead in Germany to the so-called 
extermination of “life unworthy of living” (Vernichtung lebensunwerten Le-
bens). It is also known that extensive sterilising programmes were initiated in 
Scandinavia – Denmark since 1929, Sweden since 1935 – which were based on 
the same ideological basis. The reasons for this were the already mentioned 
fear of the population’s “degeneration” as well as the successive establishing of 
the modern welfare states since the early 1930s. In this early phase, social 
welfare was connected to the recipients’ bio-social “aptitude” in order not to 
waste any resources. Social welfare was not intended to merely relieve distress, 
but was part of a programme to create a physically and psychically “healthy” 
people that was up to the challenges of Modernity. The people in Sweden or 
Denmark respectively were to be conditioned for a capitalistic method of pro-
duction in order to generate resources for the social-democratic welfare state 
(cf. Nilsson 2003). 
IV. 
For Sweden one also has to take the collectivistic structure of society into ac-
count that limited the individuals’ rights significantly (Rothstein 1992; Daun 
1996). Thus, it is not wrong to compare the Swedish welfare state and the 
“Third Reich”. Three protagonists who wrote books that were very popular in 
both countries seem particularly interesting: Friedrich Burgdörfer and Alva and 
Gunnar Myrdal (cf. Etzemüller 2007, 53-68). Burgdörfer published “Volk ohne 
Jugend” (“A People without Youth”) in 1932; the latter “Kris i befolknings-
frågan” (“Crisis in the Population Question”) in 1934. The diagnosis is similar 
in both cases: the birth rate sinks dramatically because less and less families 
have children. This is due to the bad material conditions, but also to the 
women’s situation in modern society. Both sides thus propagated birth-
encouraging welfare politics on the one hand and sterilisations on the other, so 
that the “valuable” classes would have more children and the “inferior” less. In 
this respect, the Myrdals and Burgdörfer are illustrative examples for the power 
of the already mentioned matrix. 
Friedrich Burgdörfer was born in 1890 and was one of Germany’s leading 
statisticians since 1921. He was a member of the NSDAP and belonged to the 
crucial German and international demographic and race-political institutions. In 
1945 he was released from his post. Since 1949 he was allowed to teach again 
and since the 1950s he once again became a member of several institutions and 
represented the German demography at international conferences (vom Brocke 
1998). He published his scenario of crisis since the early 1930s: The German 
people ceased to be a growing people; they are about to exterminate themselves 
due to infertility. In most other European countries, the women’s net birthing 
capacity was higher than in Germany. Germany, according to Burgdörfer, 
already lacked an offspring of 8 million children. At the same time, the people 
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tended to live longer and longer. Thus, the number of old people increased and 
the top of the ‘pyramid’ broadened while its base shrunk. In this way, the 
‘pyramid’ of a healthily constructed population – few old people and a young, 
numerous workforce – would develop into a bell first and finally into an urn: 
more and more old people were going to be pitted against fewer and fewer 
children. Their burden to provide for the older people would increase. Three to 
four children per family would be required, otherwise the population would 
become extinct in circa 300 years. The qualitatively premium, culture-bearing 
parts of the population (middle class and the rural population) extinguished 
themselves, while the significantly “less gifted part” was proliferating. 
Burgdörfer claimed that one would only be able to solve the problem by im-
proving the material situation of families with many children. Social welfare, 
however, would have to remain limited in order to prevent fertility from be-
coming a profitable business for those families. Fundamentally it was not the 
individual, but the family as the cell of the state and the people that was to be 
strengthened. He advocated a tax reform by which families were to be relieved 
while childless marriages were to pay higher taxes. Housing policy was to take 
care of overcoming the unhealthy living conditions in the cities. Furthermore, 
the city population was to be motivated to move back to the countryside and, 
thus, to develop healthily by a planned housing programme. A parenthood-
insurance was supposed to ensure the living standards in order to secure the 
quantity and quality of the Volkskörper. The mothers’ “double burden” was to 
be remedied by making female employment obsolete. Women were to attend to 
their natural job, i.e. to be a housewife and a mother and to give birth to chil-
dren. In order to achieve that, Burgdörfer advocated religious and moral re-
newal, a mental retuning of the people (Burgdörfer 1932; 1929; 1930). 
In 1934 “Sterben die weißen Völker?” (“Are the White Peoples dying?”) 
was published. Here Burgdörfer prognosticated the same developments for 
other European countries as those he had anticipated to be a threat to Germany. 
They also ran the risk of being “outborn”. The countries as such would not die 
out, but their inner structure and the balance of power between the peoples – 
i.e. the balance between “whites” and “coloureds” – would change. An exact 
definition of races seemed problematic to him, but that did not restrain him 
from henceforth putting the whites in opposition to the coloureds. The former 
choked their fertility and were about to commit demographic suicide (“Ras-
senselbstmord”). The biologically inferior coloureds increasingly proliferated. 
Globalisation would only intensify the problem since economy does not know 
any racial or ethnic differences, only workers and consumers. It would prefer 
cheap workers from foreign, primitive peoples and would thus abet the infiltra-
tion of dissimilar elements. France served him as an example. Here, so he 
claimed, the military would replenish its small number of recruits with Afri-
cans. By doing so, the French would accelerate the already existent foreign 
infiltration and would provide a dangerous breach for the foreign races to in-
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vade the occident. With their deployment in the First World War, the coloureds 
had lost their respect for the whites, since they “defeated” a white people, i.e. 
the Germans in World War I. With this awareness, they returned to the colo-
nies. And this would become a major threat. Everywhere, in South- and Central 
America, in the USA and Australia, according to Burgdörfer, negroes and 
indigenes were on the rise; soon “Africa would belong to the Africans” 
(Burgdörfer 1934, 81). There were not enough whites to populate the empty 
spaces of the earth and to prevent the coloureds’ expansion. “Will […] they 
hold their grounds to the rising flood of coloureds, or will they be eroded and 
washed away by it?” (Burgdörfer 1934, 8). This vital question would not be 
decided on military battlefields, but by the mothers’ fertility. That was the only 
glimmer of hope and thus Burgdörfer deemed – in view of Italy and the “Third 
Reich” – change to be possible. Just like the disease, health could also be catch-
ing.  
Alva and Gunnar Myrdal do still belong to the most important intellectuals 
in Swedish history. Their influence went, in addition to that, way beyond the 
small country in the north (Etzemüller 2010; Hirdman 2008). Gunnar Myrdal 
was born in 1898; his wife-to-be in 1902. Gunnar made a very successful ca-
reer as an economist, social expert and economic politician; Alva Myrdal as a 
social expert and politician in different fields. Gunnar was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in economy in 1974 and Alva received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. 
With a lot of media attention they set out in the 1930s to fundamentally reform 
Swedish society. With poised instincts they barged into the Swedish discussion 
about the declining birthrate and conceived a book that would make the ques-
tion of population the vehicle for a radical reform of society. In 1934 “Kris i 
befolkningsfrågan” was published and dominated – heavily criticised, but un-
disputed – the Swedish discussion about population (Myrdal and Myrdal 1997). 
They had put the book right between the different positions on the question of 
population in order to redefine the field anew. In the beginning, the diagnosis 
resembles that of Burgdörfer. They observed a dramatic decline of the Swedish 
birthrate. Men’s material situation, so they claimed, was precarious. They were 
only to keep their living standard, if fertility was to drop significantly below the 
reproduction limit. Few and few children were born in rural areas, too, and a 
flood of senile elderly was to be suspected. The lower social strata had too 
many, the upper too few children; this would only change, if contraceptive 
practices became known in the lower strata. The Myrdals shared the worry of a 
shrinking population with the – as they called them – conservatives. To both, 
so they claimed, a shrinking population would lead to an intake of “inferior 
human material” (Myrdal and Myrdal 1997, 107) into the attractive Sweden. 
These inferior people would lead to descending wages and threatened stability. 
The Myrdals did not, however, share the conservatives indignation about birth-
control. Contraception would neither attack the morale nor lead to an automatic 
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decline in population. On the contrary: in line with the Neo-Malthusians they 
supported an active birth-control and the legalisation of abortions. 
They considered the order of society to be the main problem. In pre-
capitalistic times, so they claimed, the family was a unit of production and 
consumption well-adapted to the environment. Man and woman produced as a 
family. The age of liberal-capitalistic individualism reduced the family to con-
sumption and led to a significantly more patriarchic society. The old family 
structure fitted less and less to the technical and industrial society. Women lost 
their formerly important role and society’s increasing disorganisation was not 
to be corrected by some adjustments. Thus, economy had to be reformed first. 
Production and export had to be increased in order to provide the state with 
more financial resources. By doing so, production as well as consumption had 
to be subordinated in a planned-economy way to the interests of society. Then 
the incomes had to be radically redistributed in favour of the families, namely 
by a primarily prophylactic social policy that was to ease the material burden. 
Women, so they claimed, had less and less children, because their professional 
life, housework and motherhood were incommensurate. Thus, new apartments 
had to be built in a functional lay out that would reduce housework by ration-
alisation. The stress children could generate was finally to be reduced, so that 
women would decide to have children again. Already a few months after their 
birth, the children were to spend their days in nurseries, then kindergartens, 
preschools and schools. 
Central to their thoughts was that in these institutions a new type of men 
was to be trained, since the “excessive” and “wrong” individualism of the 
“liberalistic age” had produced nothing but “atomised egoists”, who were re-
sponsible for the declining birthrate. Thus, the children were to be freed from 
their unhappy and overburdened parents and their education to be collectivised, 
rationalised and depathologised in the nurseries and schools. They would learn 
social behaviour in the collective, learn the basics of a rational lifestyle, were 
under the constant supervision of teachers and doctors, who recorded and cor-
rected any mental, social and sanitary deviation. Every child were to carry a 
health-card in which every observation was to be recorded, but also informa-
tion on the parents and the living conditions at home. This programme was 
supposed to produce a new type of human in the long run. A voluntary, 
healthy, collective citizen, who would be able to harmonically (for himself) and 
optimally (for society) fit into social life. Only by employing these measures, 
the population would grow again and increase its quality at the same time. 
The Myrdals thought, just like Burgdörfer, that mentally weak, physically, 
morally and socially disabled people produced to many children. How danger-
ous their genetic disposition really was, however, they were nor sure about. 
The working class was not eugenically inferior per se, they claimed. The rele-
vance of environmental factors was not to be underestimated. But a sediment of 
individuals that were unwanted for race-hygienic reasons, could be accurately 
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identified and singled out. In these (few) cases they wanted to sterilise exten-
sively on the basis of eugenic and social indicators; if necessary, these sterilisa-
tions were to be forced, even though the eugenic effect of the means seemed 
quite uncertain to them. This “sediment” was the reason, why the Myrdals 
trusted in birth-control by contraception, abortion and sterilisation despite their 
intention to increase fertility: only those children that had a chance of good 
living conditions should be allowed to be born. There was no justification, so 
they claimed, that children grew up in socially bad circumstances or that they 
were educated by feeble-minded parents (Myrdal 1940; Myrdal 1941). 
By comparing Burgdörfer and the Myrdals, the huge differences are strik-
ing. Burgdörfer found a seamless transfer into the ‘Third Reich’, while the 
Myrdals returned from the USA in 1940 to defend their country against an 
impending German invasion. Burgdörfer’s model of society was absolutely 
compatible to National Socialism; the Myrdals’ ideas might seem totalitarian at 
the first glance, their ideal of a political constitution was, however, doubtlessly 
democratic. Burgdörfer designed a socio-political programme in order to secure 
the traditional social structure, to increase the birth rate and to defend the na-
tion. The Myrdals intended to radically remodel the outdated social social 
structure and used the question of population as an argument for that. Burgdör-
fer and the Myrdals operated with the same people/space-model: the German or 
Swedish nation, respectively, as spaces with clear-cut boundaries were inhab-
ited by a racially homogenous ethnic group. These peoples procreated insuffi-
ciently, thus both were threatened by “over-ageing” and “foreign infiltration”. 
In all their theoretical models, racially differentiated fertility was accompanied 
by socially differentiated fertility, i.e. the assumption that a sufficiently high or 
low fertility was desired. The world was separated in negative (foreign/anti-
social) and positive elements. The unwanted parts of society had to be “cut” by 
sterilisation. 
All three protagonists also shared a criticism of the capitalistic world order 
and the disastrous living conditions in the cities. It is furthermore noticeable 
that women were at the centre of attention. Burgdörfer did not mention men at 
all and the Myrdals discussed them only marginally. The projected population 
policy was completely concentrated on women. In Burgdörfer’s thinking they 
had to leave their jobs and return home. The Myrdals wanted to ease their 
chores at the homely stove and have them stay in their jobs in order to make 
them want to rise children. This seems to be a free choice, but boiled down to a 
conditioning of the women. They were supposed to learn to choose voluntarily 
what was good for them. Ultimately, both Burgdörfer and the Myrdals were all 
about coping with Modernity. All three of them were concerned with the burn-
ing, socio-political themes, namely the gender-question, the living conditions in 
the big cities, the nation and, finally, and overarching everything, the question 
how society could be strengthened against Modernity in the form of a Volks-
gemeinschaft. This was not a genuine national-socialist issue, but a common 
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unease with Modernity. National-Socialist Germany – and Friedrich Burgdör-
fer with it – tried to solve the problem with dictatorial means, Sweden – and the 
Myrdals – in a democratic way. Problematising Modernity was common to all 
of them. Solving the question of population was supposed to tame Modernity 
(Etzemüller 2009). 
Comparing these protagonists and these two countries therefore illustrates 
the ability of the population discourse to nestle into very different political 
contexts. Sweden was a society generally putting emphasis on inclusion. 
Eliminating “inferior” people was just the ultima ratio. The goal was always a 
strengthening of the socialdemocratic “folkhem”, i.e. the “People’s Home”. 
The “Third Reich”, on the other side, put emphasis on the extensive “elimina-
tion” of all “vermin to society”. In Sweden, sterilisations became less important 
only by the mid-70s. Up until then approximately 60,000 people – mostly 
women – had been sterilised; about 20,000 against their will. Even if this seems 
intolerable – at least this programme’s central aim always was one of “human-
ity” (Runcis 1998; Tydén 2002). 
V. 
In Germany, there was no break after 1945. Even those German experts, who 
had undertaken most brutal experiments on humans in concentration camps, 
retained their influence. Attempts to stipulate ethnical differences via social 
criteria were still made. In 1962, Ilse Schwidetzky published her “Neue Ras-
senkunde” (“New Ethnogeny”). In the preceding year, a member of the 
younger generation, Hans Wilhelm Jürgens, qualified for a professorship with a 
thesis on “Asozialität als biologisches und sozialbiologisches Problem” (“Anti-
sociality as a Biological and Socio-Biological Problem”). There was still the 
old eugenics in which human beings were evaluated according to their social 
quality. Human genetics, on the other hand, which now dominated the biologi-
cal side of the discourse on population, viewed eugenics critically – but had the 
worldview really changed fundamentally? (cf. Schwidetzky 1962; 1954; 1950; 
Jürgens 1961; Müller and Pfeil 1952). 
Looking at the “Third World” is like looking into a mirror. Since the 1950s 
the “Third World” increasingly became a new field for the population dis-
course. Back then the fear of declining birthrates and population in Europe and 
an increase of births and population in the colonies became manifest (Burgdör-
fer 1934; 1951). This model of industrial countries’ “underpopulation” and 
developing countries’ “overpopulation” shaped the discussion (cf. Kaiser 1981; 
Meadows 1972) – though with one characteristic shift: the “Third World’s” 
growth in population and its effects became the centre of attention. This was 
partly due to the “Cold War”, namely the worry that an impoverishment there 
would lead to a drift towards the Eastern Block. It was also partly due to a new 
“humanitarian” approach: population policy came to be seen as part of devel-
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opment aid. Thus, programmes to check the population growth were de-
manded. One had to – following the paradigmatic Brundtland-Report from 
1987 – help the people with education to self-determinedly choose the size of 
their families – after all, the world had a choice: either limit the “Third 
World’s” fertility or put the world’s food reserves at risk (Hauff 1987). This 
approach was paternalistic. Just like Malthus, it put the alimental base in the 
centre, i.e. an intensely growing population was contrasted with a not infinitely 
increasable agriculture. Furthermore, a pessimistic picture of the industrial 
countries’ “overflowing” with people from the developing countries was 
painted. Finally, the definitions of the problem were concentrated on women: if 
they had too few children in Europe, they were following the “wrong ideals” of 
“self-fulfilment” instead of thinking about “traditions”; while the women in the 
developing countries became to many, because they were still in the grip of 
tradition instead of becoming “emancipated”. 
VI. 
I will now summarise the most important elements appearing in practically 
every text on the question of population – although in different ratios of mix-
ing. 
- The prognoses have been similar since a long time. It is always the sinking 
birthrate that is lamented. The population pyramid’s basis, i.e. the number of 
young people, shrinks. Due to the higher life expectancy the pyramid’s top 
broadens; the pyramid becomes the bell and finally the urn. The population 
was growing in absolute numbers, but this was due to an excessive immigra-
tion. Furthermore, this was considered as a chimera, because in the future 
the absolute population would shrink, too. In 1950 or 1985 or 2050 the abso-
lute population would only be about a half or a third of the respective year 
of prognosis. 
- Nearly all the texts make, still today, two mostly implicit though basic as-
sumptions. Space and population are connected to each other. Space is un-
derstood as the territory of the nation states and their boarders to neighbour-
ing spaces. Thus, a certain relation between the spaces develops, since these 
spaces are inhabited by a certain population. The population – just like the 
space – is also thought of as a homogenous entity. One does not have to read 
nazi texts to find very clear statements that “population” always means al-
legedly ethnically ancestral inhabitants, which in the early 20th century was 
the ideal of the “nordic race”. German sociologist Elisabeth Pfeil formulated 
in 1939 with a rarely found clarity: “A space has a ‘force of concentrating to 
the inside and of separating to the outside’; relationships develop within a 
space and lead to an isolation to the outside” (Pfeil 1939, 5). To her, popula-
tion was a community that experienced a space collectively and developed 
an otherness, a peculiarity compared with the inhabitants of other spaces. It 
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was the space that made a boarder between the inner and the outer, between 
the community and the others possible. Back then this was aimed at the na-
tional-socialist “Lebensraum”, but this double boarder that separates com-
munity and space from the other has basically shaped the political thinking 
about the population from the 19th century up until today. 
- Thus, a specific correlation between space and population with a static and a 
dynamic component evolves. Every space has its population. The ideal is a 
fixed relation, but the reality is demographic fluctuation. On the one hand 
this fluctuation happens within a territory (e.g. rural exodus) and on the o-
ther between territories. This is due to a specific gap: There are spaces with 
too much and spaces with too little population. “Overpopulated” spaces de-
velop a “population-pressure” on the neighbouring space; “underpopulated” 
spaces exert demographic pressure on the neighbouring spaces. The statistic 
ideal would be then: an optimum population that comes from a harmonic re-
lationship between space and population. Disaccords lead to dynamics that 
are considered problematic. Decreasing birthrates would – and this is a re-
petitive argument to be found in those texts – inevitably lead to a shrinking 
population and this would make the space more attractive for eugenically 
“inferior” immigrants: e.g. Poles and other Slavs in Germany, Finns or other 
immigrants in Sweden, Morrocans and Italians in France. The resulting ra-
cial hybrids would, in any case, eventually threat the original inhabitants. 
Without the relation between space and population the assumption of an 
over- or underpopulation would not be possible. 
- Thus, an odd connection between the demographic and the eugenic question 
seems to emerge. The discussion about population was never only about the 
population’s quantity, but also always about its quality. It was always an 
important question who had children and who did not, which children were 
wanted and which were not. Socially “worthy” people from the Middle- and 
Upper-strata had, according to the demographers, too few, while the socially 
“inferior” – i.e. proletarians in the negative sense, day labourers, beggars, 
mentally weak, etc. – had too many children. Since it was considered a valid 
assumption up to the 1950s that biological defects – such as epilepsy, mental 
disorders, cleft palates, alcoholism, anti-social behaviour, obstinacy, stingi-
ness and so on – were passed on, such “elements” had to be deterred from 
procreation. Thus, sterilisation laws were enacted even before the “Third 
Reich”, e.g. in Denmark and Sweden (1929 and 1935, 1941, respectively), 
that were in force until the 1970s. 
- Practically every author considered the cities as eugenically problematic 
spaces. The rural population that fled the country either climbed the social 
ladder in the cities and assimilated to the upper-strata’s generative behav-
iour, i.e. did not have any children anymore; or they descended socially, 
took over “anti-social” ways of living, which they passed on to way too 
many children. These, in turn, survived thanks to the modern social policy, 
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which had suspended nature’s mechanisms of selection. Hence, demo-
graphic policy could not merely put emphasis on increasing the birthrate, 
but had to deter the eugenically dangerous “human material” from procrea-
tion, too. Potential immigrants were also eugenically problematic. They had 
to be blocked by an active nativity policy. The Swedish and several German 
demographers were actually no “Lebensraum”-propagandists, although their 
way of thinking was an important precondition for the aggressive politics of 
the “Third Reich”. This thinking, however, did not seem very exotic – nei-
ther pre-1933 nor post-1945 –, as one can easily find in many German and 
Swedish texts. Eugenic demarcations remained a self-evident part of demo-
graphic argumentations way after the end of World War II. 
- The diagnoses why married couples did not have any more children differed 
in details: the reasons were found in a “rationalisation of the sexual life”, the 
incommensurateness of being a mother and having a career, the costliness of 
children in economically difficult times or the parents’ will to satisfy their 
consumer drive before having children. Fundamentally, however, their was 
a broad consensus on the changing effects of modern lifestyle on the social- 
and the family-structures. The same Modernity that led to the eugenic de-
generation of people due to urbanisation and industrialisation also impeded 
the desired births, since the “worthy” middle-strata either “suffered” from 
excessive consume or material hardship. This diagnosis was the justification 
for the – eugenically not undisputed – modern social policy in Sweden and 
Germany, which was supposed to form the basis for a larger number of chil-
dren, which were socio-politically responsibly differentiated by “worthy” 
and “unworthy” recipients – not primarily following a differentiation of 
needy and non-needy. 
- In the centre of the debate were – more or less explicitly – almost exclu-
sively women. It were women that did not have any more children, since 
they allegedly rather pursued a career or lived in luxury. It were women at 
whom the socio-political programmes aimed at; and it were women who 
were generally sterilised – either because their husbands were supposed to 
be “anti-social” or because they were to be prevented from further “deterio-
ration”. In demographic policy, men were checked for their functionality in 
terms of providing for the family. In the population discourse, they almost 
do not appear and if so only as the bearers of future burdens. 
VII. 
By summarising these points one can see how very much the argumentations 
followed one and the same basic structure: There is an ideal relation between 
space and “ancestral” population. This relation is under a constant threat due 
to a growth of population at the wrong place and the wrong time. The starting-
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point is always the woman: women are supposed to – depending on social 
strata or region – either increase or decelerate their fertility. 
In Sweden as in Western Germany one could still find the same demo-
graphic threat-scenarios as at the turn of the century. In 1976, a Swedish news-
paper could actually make the situation subject to irony: “Are we now sup-
posed to become extinct again?” (Svenska Dagbladet 1976). And a few years 
before geneticists in Germany had seriously discussed if a one percent increase 
of hereditary metabolic defects every thirty years would pose a threat to the 
population. “No”, said one geneticist, “yes”, another, because: “The human 
society can only then tolerate a life with unnecessary prosthesises [i.e. thera-
pies, medicine etc.], if it can totally secure a future life without any catastro-
phes” – which are threatening the fight against the accumulation of those dis-
eases (Wendt 1970, 36). He nevertheless conceded that one should not bring 
out the big guns, e.g. sterilisations, but by diagnostic counselling suggest to 
parents to voluntarily waive genetically defect children. 
Only with the beginning of the new millennium the opponents to the apoca-
lyptic discourse could make themselves heard in the media. Since then the 
hysteric demographic scenarios of doom are contested more and more in-
tensely. But, is that valid for the biological side of the population question, too? 
The population is still latently classified. With the term “human capital” indi-
viduals are demanded to decide either to “deselect” or to make their children fit 
for the postmodern meritocracy. The social lower strata are still considered as 
problem areas, in which too many children are born. It is not genetic defects 
and “antisociality” that is inherited anymore, but their resistance to education 
that threatens society’s human capital. Thus, the matrix that turns the question 
of population into a social question is still virulent. 
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